Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1950

Burton O. Compton, Burton Stanley Compton,
and Lester O. Comption v. Ogden Union Railway
and Depot Co. : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Bryan P. Leverich; M. J. Bronson; A. U. Miner; Howard F. Coray; D. A. Alsup; COunsel for
Defendant and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Compton v. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co., No. 7541 (Utah Supreme Court, 1950).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1309

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
BURTON 0. . COMPTON, BURTON
STANLEY COMPTON, AND LESTER 0. COMPTON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No.

7541

vs.
OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

.
a·

I

.~

l

r

"E
D
T? \ L
I' ~\)\1
-----~
';)

1::i:>O

BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CO RAY, .
D. A. ALSUP,
Counsel for Defendant

and Respondent.
10 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

l:

ARROW PRESS, SALT LAKE

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX

Page
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
THE DECEASED, EMMA COMPTON,
WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.

6

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE
JURY ON THE THEORY OF LAST
CLEAR CHANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

A. Deceased's Negligence was Contributing and Concurring Until the Moment of Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

B. The Defendant Did Not Have the Last
Clear Chance to A void the Accident. . . .

39

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

Texts Cited
38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Par. 223, 224 ............. 32, 33
44 Am. Jur., Railroads, Par. 477 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

44 Am. Jur., Railroads, Par. 489 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

Restatement of Torts, Par. 479, 480 ............... 22, 23
Cases Cited
Anderson v. Bingham & Garfield Ry. Co., .. Utah .. ,
214 P. 2d 607 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31

INDEX-Continued

Page
Bates v. San Pedro, L.A. & S. L. R. Co., 38 Utah 568,
114 p. 527 00000000000000. ' . . 00 0. 00. 000000017' 20
°

Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 245, 166 P. 2d 205

°

0. 00

9

Butler v. Payne, 59 Utah 383, 203 P. 869 0 00000000011, 17
°

Chicago, R.I. and P. Ry. Co. v. Wheelbarger, 75 Kan.
811, 88 P. 531 000000000000... 00. 0.. 0.. 000. 000 16
Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co., 73 Utah 486,
275 P. 582 000000..... 000 00000. 0 0.. 00..... 00
°

°

7

Drummond v. Union Pacific R. Co., 111 Utah 289,
177 P. 2d 903 ........ 00000. 000000000. 00000016,17
Eaton v. Southern Pacific Co., 22 Cal. App. 461, 134
P. 801 0000000000000000 000000000000000000000 16
°

Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P. 2d 1049 0000000.

7

Girdner v. Union Oil Co. of California, 13 P. 2d 915 00 34
Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 P. 2d 230 . 00038, 42
Holmgren v. Union Pac. R. Co., 00 Utah 00, 198 P.
2d 459 0000. 000. 000000000000000000000000022, 32, 40
Hopp v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., et al., 147 P. 2d 950 .. 0 37
Huggans v. Southern Pac. Co. (Cal.), 207 P. 2d 864 . 0 35
Jensen v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 P.
1185 0000000000000000000000. 00. 00.. 0... 0000012, 17
Jensen v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., 59 Utah 367,
204 P. 101 00. 000.. 00000. 0000.. 0............ 017, 19
Kent, et al. v. Ogden, L. & I. Ry~ Co., 50 Utah 328, 167
P. 666 00... 0. 0. 00.... 0................ 0000012, 20
Knutson v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 78 Utah 145,
2 p. 2d 102 000. . . . . . . . . . . . 0. 0. . . 0. . . . 000.. 00 29
Lawrence v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 52 Utah 414, 174
P. 817 . 000. 00.. 00...... 0. 0... 0. 0........ 0000 12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483,
123 P. 97 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

Malizia v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 53 Utah 122, 178
P. 756 ......................... , ........... 18, 19
Marshall v. Ogden Ry. & Depot Co., . . Utah .. , 221
P. 2d 868 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

Mosso v. E. H. Stanton Co., 75 Wash, 220, 134 P. 941. .

36

Newell's Estate, In Re, 78 Utah 463, 5 P. 2d 230 . . . . .

7

Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219,
134 P. 567 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

Oswald v. Utah Light & Ry. Co., 39 Utah 245, 117
P. 46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

Perrin v. Union Pacific R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 P. 405 .

10

Peterson v. Sorensen, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. 2d 12 . . . . . . .

9

Pilcher's Estate, In Re, .. Utah .. , 197 P. 2d 143 . . . .
9
Ryan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 71 .. 7, 13, 27
Sprague v. Nothern Pac. Ry. Co., 40 Mont. 481, 107
P. 412 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177 . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
Steggell v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., 50 Utah 139, 167
P. 237 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Stephenson v. Northwestern Pac. R. Co., 208 Cal.
749, 284 P. 913 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 Utah
276, 90 p. 402 ..................... 12, 13, 20, 24, 25
Thompson v. Porter, 151 P. 2d 433 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 112
Utah 189, 186 P. 2d 293 ................... 41, 42, 44
Wilkinson v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 35 Utah 110,
99 P. 466 ............................... 12, 13, 20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
COMPTON, BURTON
STANLEY COMPTON, AND LESTER 0. COMPTON,

BURTON

0.

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No.
vs.

7541

OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
PRELIMINARY STAT·EMENT
The parties will be designated herein as they were at
the trial.
This is an action brought by the surviving husband and
sons of Mrs. Emma Compton, who was killed by defendant's diesel engine on September 8, 1949. We understand
plaintiff Burton 0. Compton, the only plaintiff who was
in any measure dependent upon the deceased, has died since
the trial, but we realize this fact does not affect the appeal.
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The fatal accident out of which the action arose occurred on
the defe:Qdant's track in the vicinity of the 24th Street viaduct in Ogden, Utah. The deceased was a pedestrian.
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' ·evidence at the
trial and in the absence of the jury, defendant orally moved
the court for a judgment of nonsuit in its favor and against
the plaintiffs. After hearing arguments by counsel the
trial court granted the defendant's motion and in written
conclusions of law which it filed the court ruled that the
deceased was guilty of negligence directly and proximately
contributing to her death. The court determined as one of
its findings that a jury question was presented as to the ·
negligence of the defendant, and hence that issue is not
involved in this appeal. For this reason, the evidence as to
the use of the area for travel by the ~eneral public, evidence
designed to establish the status of the deceased as a licensee
and fix upon the defendant a duty of keeping a reasonable
lookout for her, is unimportant in this appeal. Only two
questions are involved, viz : vVas the deceased contributorily
negligent, and if so, did the defendant have the last clear
chance to a void the accident?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant accepts the statement of facts contained
in plaintiff's brief with the following exceptions and additions: We believe statements contained therein respecting
the use made of the area by the general public unnecessary
but harmless. It was our understanding that the witness
Mrs. Earl E. Laws testified the deceased took a definite
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number of steps down the track before the impact, but we
concede the written record is as plaintiffs have reported
it in their statement of facts. Plaintiffs state·, at page 4 of
their brief, that witness Feller testified that a person walking from the base of the stairs toward the track along the
path would reach the point of impact before he could see
down the track. It is true he so testified, but~:'on further
examination he clarified this statement, and at page 26 of
the Record he stated that a clear view was available to the
deceased down the track in the direction from which the
engine approached from the time she took one step beyond
the posts shown in defendant's Exhibit 2. Also, this same
witness identified defendant's Exhibit 2 as being a representation of the view available to the deceased at a point
approximately 10 feet north of the track (R. 51). The
deceased approached from the north (R. 8, 45).
We believe on the issue of the deceased's contributory
negligence the physical evidence as disclosed by defendant's
Exhibits 1 and 2 and plaintiffs' Exhibits D and I is important. From these exhibits the court can learn the approximate view available to the deceased as she walked toward the track. Plaintiffs' evidence disclosed the engine
was traveling about 10 miles per hour (R. 10). It was a
clear, bright morning (R. 47, 48). The deceased walked in
a southerly direction 25 feet from the bottom of the viaduct
stairs to the point of the accident (R. 8, 19-20, 45). The
engine approached from the northwest (R. 9, 12). Defendant's Exhibit 2 shows the view available to deceased looking
northwesterly up the track from any point 10 feet north of
the track (R. 51). Reference to the map of the area shows
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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it is approximately 370 feet from the point of impact to
the east side of the bridge shown in defendant's Exhibit 2.
This exhibit shows a clear view was available to deceased to
a point far beyond and northwest of this bridge. Defendant's Exhibit 1 shows more clearly the straight track extending far to the northwest of this bridge. If there was
an engine anywhere on the track within the view shown in
defendant's Exhibit 2, Mrs. Compton should have seen it.
Plaintiff's Exhibit D shows in reverse the view available to deceased. This photograph was taken at a point on
the track approximately 100 feet northwest of the point of
impact (R. 24). Under plaintiffs' evidence as to its speed,
the engine was at the point where this photograph was taken
about seven seconds before the accident. The only reasonable
inference from the evidence is that the engine was somewhere between the point where this photograph was taken
and the point of impact at the time Mrs. Compton was
walking from the posts shown in the exhibit to the point
of impact.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit I shows in reverse the view available to deceased back to approximately the west side of the
bridge (R. 57). This would be over 300 feet from the point
of impact. P.~.ssuming it took deceased eight seconds to walk
the 25 feet from the bottom of the stairs to the place where
she was struck, which would be a slow pace, the engine
would have had to travel over 25 miles per hour to move in
the same time from the place where this photograph was
taken to the point of the accident. Assuming it took the
deceased four seconds to walk from the posts shown in this
exhibit to the point of impact, the engine would have had
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to travel over 50 miles per hour to move in the same four
seconds from the place where this photograph was taken
to the point of the accident. Plaintiffs' evidence shows the
engine was moving only 10 miles per hour. Both plaintiffs'
and defendant's exhibits show beyond any doubt that the
engine was visible to the deceased had she looked before
approaching the track.
On the issue of last clear chance we believe the following evidence is important. The crew members on defendant's engine which struck the deceased did not see her until
after the engine had passed over her body ( R. 10, 28) . There
was no evidence that the deceased had caught her foot,
fallen, or was otherwise physically unable to extricate herself from her position of peril prior to the accident. The
evidence is that she was walking at the time of the collision
(R. 46, 47). The point of impact was 25 feet from the bottom of the viaduct stairway which the deceased descended
(R. 8, 19, 20). At the closest point, the track is 171/2 feet
from the bottom of the stairway (R. 20). Officer Feller
testified that it was his observation that I\1rs. Compton was
struck just as she arrived at the track (R. 21, 22). He
further testified the point of impact was straight south of
the bottom of the viaduct stairs. Mrs. Laws testified that
just about the time she and Mrs. Compton got up close to
the track the train came by ( R. 48) . Again she testified
that she and the deceased walked a few steps along the path
before the accident occurred (R. 50).
All of the above facts are undisputed.
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT THE DECEASED, EMMA
COMPTON, WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.
The determination of whether or not the deceased was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law involve-s consideration of fundamental and elementary principles of
the law of negligence. Our problem is materially simplified
by the fact that there are Utah cases covering practically
·every proposition in dispute, and there are practically no
conflicts among these applicable decisions. We have examined all of the Utah cases cited by plaintiffs in their
brief, and we find fault with none of them. Some of them
are quoted herein as authority for the propositions we urge.
In view of the. uniformity among the Utah cases on the
questions involved, it is. not surprising to find both parties
citing identical cases as authority for their opposing contentiop.s. We believe the Utah cases cited by plaintiffs are
right. We believe plaintiffs are wrong in their interpretations or applications of these cases. And yet the clear
language of the cases is not susceptible of such misuse.
We shall commence our consideration of the issue of
contributory negligence, as did plaintiffs in their brief,
with the presumption that at the time of the fatal collision
the deceased was exercising due care for her own safety.
It is necessary that we first determine the nature and effect
of this presumption. The presumption that deceased at the
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time of her death was exercising due care springs from an
acknowledgment by the law of the strong instinct of selfpreservation. Like the presumption of sanity (State v.
Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177), and the presumption of
intent in the delivery of a deed (In Re Newell's· Estate,
78 Utah 463, 5 P. 2d 230) , and the presumption of control
of an automobile (Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P. 2d
1049), it is a presumption of law as distinguished from a
presumption of fact. As such, the presumption exists only
so long as there is no evidence presented showing the circumstances surrounding the death.
As stated by the Utah court in Ryan v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 71:
"In the absence of evidence there is a presumption that the deceased used due care and, for his
protection, did all that reasonably was required of
him. Had the court charged that and stopped, the
charge would not have been erroneous. Vvhen, how- ·
ever, facts and circumstances are proven to show
just what the deceased did, or failed to do, then his
care, or the want of it, is to be determined, not on the
presumption, but upon the facts and circumstances
proven. That is, whenever the facts or circumstances
are shown concerning which the presumption is indulged, the presumption ceases, and the controversy
is to be decided by the weight of the evidence adduced. * * *"
In Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 73 Utah
486, 275 P. 582, the court discussed the nature and effect of
this presumption. On appeal the defendant assigned as
error an instruction by the court that the deceased was
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exercising due care at the time of the accident. In sustaining the exception to this instruction, the court said :
"The claim in such particular is that the court
by such instruction in effect directed the jury that
there was such a presumption regardless of what
the evidence might be bearing on the question of the
care or the want of it exercised by the deceased. In
such particular it is urged that the court ought to
have directed the jury that such a presumption only
exists or may be indulged, in the absence or independently of evidence as to the care or the want of it
exercised by the deceased, or of facts or circumstances from which inferences may be deduced with
respect thereto; but, when evidence or facts and
circumstances respecting such matters are adduced,
then the question of the care or the want of it exercised by the deceased is to be determined on the
evidence and facts and circumstances, and not upon
the presumption. The rule contended for by the appellant is the rule prevailing in this jurisdiction.
Ryan v. Un. Pac. R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 71;
State v. Steadman (Utah) 259 P. 326.
"In some jurisdictions. cases may be found where
it is held that presumptions have evidentiary force,
and as such may be considered. But in most of such
cases it will be seen that the matter dealt with was
a presumption or inference of fact, and not a presumption of law, or where the former was mistaken
or misconceived for the latter. As is recognized
generally by authors on evidence as well as by adjudged cases, there is a well-defined distinction between a presumption of law and a presumption of
fact. Not observing the distinction has led to confusion in some of the cases. This is clearly pointed
out by the author, 1 Elliott on Evidence, Paragraph
76; and in 1 Jones Comms. on Evidence (2d Ed.)
Paragraph 23, where it is said that 'no word in the
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legal parlance is used in a greater variety of sense,
or more frequently misused, than the word "presumption." Confusion of the use extends, in fact,
beyond that term and includes as well the companion
words "assumption" and "inference."' When the
term 'presumption of law,' is properly kept in mind,
it is quite clear that such a presumption but performs the office or effect as indicated in the Ryan
and Steadman Cases, and, as shown by the texts
heretofore cited, to temporarily or in the first instance relieve the party in whose favor the presumption arises from going forward with evidence and to
cast upon the party against whom it works the duty
of going forward with evidence and of proving by
a preponderance thereof a state of facts or circumstances inconsistent with the presumption, or, in
other words, to prove the charged negligence of the
deceased, unless such negligence is shown by the
evidence adduced on the part of the plaintiff. But,
when such evidence is adduced, the question of
whether the party on whom the burden of proof
rested has or has not sustained the burden by the required quantum of evidence is to be determined upon
the evidence adduced and upon all the facts and circumstances in evidence, and not upon the presumption. In such case, the presumption of law has no
evidentiary force or effect. * * *"
A presumption of law cannot be weighed with evidence,
and once the facts are shown the presumption drops out
of the picture completely and no longer exists.. See Peterson
v. Sorensen, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. 2d 12; Buhler v. Maddison,
109 Utah 245, 166 P. 2d 205; In re Pilcher's Estate,
Utah . 0 0, 197 P. 2d 143.
The plaintiffs in their brief apparently concede the
above to be true. The cases quoted by them are consistent
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with that rule, although under the peculiar facts of those
cases the presumption of law prevailed because in each there
was no evidence produced as to the manner in which the
death occurred. Thus in Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry.
Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 P. 97, which is cited by plaintiffs at
page 10 of their brief, the body of the deceased was found
lying alongside the railroad track. Nothing was learned of
the circumstances of his death and no evidence was introduced at the trial with respect thereto. There being no
evidence, the legal presumption of due care remained unrefuted.
Likewise, Perrin v. Union Pacific R. Co., 59 Utah 1,
201 P. 405, quoted by plaintiffs at page 12 of their brief,
was a case in which there was no evidence to show how the
accident occurred. We quote from the court's opiniol} in
that case:

"* * * The instruction (that the deceased
exercised due care) is applicable only in the absence
of evidence as to just how the accident happened.
There was no eyewitness. It is only in such cases
that litigants are entitled to this or a like instruction.
* * *" (Parentheses added.)
While apparently conceding the nature and effect of
this legal presumption, plaintiffs' counsel contend that the
presumption applies in this case because there was no
evidence as to how the fatal accident occurred. We are
at a loss to understand how they can seriously urge this
contention when they themselves placed on the stand an
eyewitness who detailed the complete circumstances surrounding Mrs. Compton's death. Through this testimony
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produced by the plaintiffs we are able to trace Mrs. Compton's movements from a few moments before until the very
moment of her fatal accident. We know that she, in company with another woman, the eyewitness, Mrs. Laws,
descended the stairway at the 24th Street viaduct, walked
toward the track of the defendant railway along a little
path running beside the track, and was struck and killed
by one of the defendant's engines. We know from the evidence what she did and what she did not do. We are
acquainted with the circumstances surrounding her death,
and we must examine those known circumstances to determine whether or not she was negligent. The question is
this: Does the evidence show the deceased was contributorily negligent? If so, there is no presumption of due care
with which to concern ourselves. If the evidence shows
contributory negligence, the presumption falls before that
evidence and passes out of the picture.
We must next, then, direct our attention to the evidence and the la \V applicable thereto to determine if it shows
as a matter of law that the deceased was contributorily
negligent. V\l e shall first consider what duties the law imposes upon a person in the position of the deceased at the
time of the accident.
In Butler v. Payne, 59 Utah 383, 203 P. 869, the earlier
Utah cases announcing the duty of a traveler approaching
a railroad track are collated. The rule announced in this
case is as follows:
"The proposition that it is the duty of travelers
before attempting to cross a railroad track upon
which trains are being operated to both look and
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listen for an approaching train has been affirmed
by this court in numerous well-considered cases, and
has long since been the established law in this jurisdiction. * * *"
See also:

Jensen v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100,
138 P. 1185.

Lawrence v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 52 Utah
414, 174 P. 817.

Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 32
Utah 276, 90 P. 402.

Wilkinson v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 35 Utah
110, 99 P. 466.

Oswald v. Utah Light & Ry. Co., 39 Utah 245,
117 P. 46.
Steggell v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., 50 Utah
139, 167 P. 237.

Kent, et al. v. Ogden L. & I. Ry. Co., 50 Utah
328, 167 P. 666.
The rule of these and other cases decided by our own
court has received such wide application and has been so
almost universally applied as to be fundamental and elementary. The rule is announced as follows in 44 American
Jurisprudence, Railroads, Paragraph 477:
"Ordinarily, one who attempts to cross or who
goes or walks upon or near a railroad track without
looking and listening when by so doing he might discover the danger from an approaching train, is
quilty of contributory negligence which will defeat
his right to recover for his injuries, unless there is
a want of reasonable care on the part of the em-
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ployees of the company after becoming aware of the
perilous situation of the person injured. The track
is itself a warning. It is a place of danger. It can
never be assumed that cars are not approaching
on a track, or that there is no danger therefrom,
nor can one in full possession of his faculties who
goes upon a railroad track and fails to use his senses
for his own safety and is injured as a consequence
plead absent-mindedness to absolve himself from
negligence. This duty is a continuing one as long as
the person is upon the tracks. The duty of one on a
railroad track to look out for trains is, generally
speaking, the same whether he is a licensee, invitee,
or trespasser, for an invitation or a license to use
railroad tracks does not carry with it the right to
obstruct the road and impede the passage of trains.
* * *"
Also, it is a rule, of perhaps equally wide application
that if a traveler approaching a railroad track by looking
could have seen an approaching train, a presumption of
fact arises from the accident that he either negligently
failed to look or negligently failed to see what was there
to be seen or negligently failed to heed what he saw. In any
event, he is negligent. For a few of the Utah cases announcing this rule, see: Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L.
R. Co., supra; Wilkinson v. Oregon Short Lt"ne R. Co., supra;
and Ryan v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra.
We do not believe plaintiffs' counsel will on serious
reflection question the legal accuracy of these principles.
Such being the law, it remains only to apply that law to the
facts of this case. Those facts, as presented by plaintiffs'
own witnesses, show as a matter of law that the deceased
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failed to exercise reasonable care for her own safety and
hence was negligent.
Plaintiffs' witness., Officer Feller, testified that there
was a clear view available to deceased up the track in the
direction from which the engine approached at any point
from approximately 10 feet from the north rail of the track
right up to the point of impact. That her view was not obstructed by the concrete abutment is shown by defendant's
Exhibit 2 and plaintiffs' Exhibit D and I. These exhibits,
when examined in connection with the map of the area,
show that her view was clear and unobstructed for a distance well in .excess of 300 feet up the track. Plaintiffs'
evidence was that the train traveled at a speed of 10 miles
an hour, or less than 15 feet per second. Under the evidence
as to speed, plaintiffs themselves proved beyond substantial
doubt the deceased was contributorily negligent when they
introduced their Exhibit D, taken 100 feet northwest of the
point of impact. They left no doubt at all on the question
when they introduced their Exhibit I, taken back near the
west side of the bridge. As is apparent from these exhibits,
Mrs. Compton had a clear view at least back to the bridge,
and under the evidence the train had to be within 100 feet
of the point of impact when she was at the posts, and most
certainly it had to be between the bridge and the point of
impact. Defendant's Exhibit 2, which merely shows an
enlargement of the view available, is unnecessary, but it
certainly clinches the point. The engine did not come out of
nowhere to strike her. We have to place it on the track,
and when we do we place it where she should have seen
it if she looked. If at any time after she passed the poles
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shown in these exhibits, which poles are approximately 10
feet from the track, she had but made a cursory observation
up the track, she would have seen the engine approaching.
Certainly, if she had looked before walking right up next
to the rail or so close thereto as to be in a position of danger,
she \Vould have observed the engine. Such inference is the
only reasonable one from the facts presented at the trial,
and it leads inevitably to the conclusion as a matter of law
that she failed to exercise reasonable care. The facts in this
case are so similar to the facts in the many Utah cases
heretofore cited in which plaintiff was held to be contributorily negligent as a rnatter of law that not even fine distinctions can be drawn between them. We believe that perhaps none of the cases is as free from doubt as is this one.
Plaintiffs have not cited a single case from Utah or elsewhere in which, under facts similar to those here present,
the jury was permitted to deliberate on the issue of contributory negligence. Plaintiffs' counsel do not and cannot
reasonably argue that the established Utah law on this issue
is wrong and should now be changed. They seek only to
by-pass the clear import of the law by two devious routes.
First, they argue that the law is not applicable to the facts
of this case; and secondly, they seek to excuse Mrs. Compton's obvious neglect by several rather feeble excuses. In
pursuing their first route they fail or refuse to recognize the
undisputed evidence in the record. In pursuing their second,
we believe they ignore the law.
Listed categorically, the explanations by means of
which they seek to excuse the negligence of the deceased
are as follows :
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1. That she may have looked while her view
was obstructed by the abutment and seen nothing.
2. That she was not required to maintain a
lookout to the northwest while she was walking
southeast.
3. That the deceased was entitled to rely upon
her sense of hearing, and the engine sneaked up on
her quietly coasting down grade.

4. That it is not clear from the evidence that
even if she had looked at any point within 10 feet
from the track the engine would have been seen.
Respecting the first explanation, assuming Mrs. Compton looked at a time when her view down the tracks was
obstructed by the abutment, she was not then entitled to
assume that no train was approaching. Since there was
ample opportunity for her to make a reasonable observation
after she had passed the obstruction, it was her duty to do
so.
See:

Drummond v. Union Pac. R. Co., 111 Utah
289, 177 p. 2d 903.
Sprague v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 40 Mont.
481, 107 P. 412.
Eaton v. Southern Pac. Co., 22 Cal. App. 461,
134 P. 801.
Chicago, R. I. and P. Ry. Co. v. Wheelbarger,
75 Kan. 811, 88 P. 531.
Stephenson v. Northwestern Pac. R. Co., 208
Cal. 7 49, 284 P. 913.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
Nor can counsel find comfort in the law respecting their
contention that she vfas only required to look in the direction
in which she \Vas traveling. Since it might be anticipated
trains vvould come from either direction, she was required
to look in both directions before entering a position of
peril along the track. See Bates v. San Ped'ro, L. A. & S. L.
R. Co., 38 Utah 568, 114 P. 527; Drummond v. Union Pac. R.
Co., supra. The law just does not countenance such an excuse for an obvious breach of duty.
It may be true, as counsel contend in their third explanation, that the engine coasted quietly up to the deceased
without a warning signal. Nonetheless, her legal duty was
not limited to listening for the engine. Her duty consisted
of exercising reasonable care by both looking and listening.
See Butler v. Payne, supra, and Jensen v. Oregon Short
Line Ry. Co., 59 Utah 367, 204 P. 101, for just two of the
many Utah cases announcing this rule.
With respect to the fourth explanation, counsel. urge
against the evidence and against their own previous argument that the train could have been moving rapidly under
power down the track until shortly before the colllision,
when it was quietly braked down to a speed of about 10
miles per hour and coasted into the deceased. Thus they
argue that the jury could have found that even if deceased
had looked at any point when within 10 feet of the track,
it might be that the train was not there to be seen. Again
we refer the court to defendant's Exhibit 2 and plaintiffs'
Exhibits D and I. It will be observed again that the deceased had a clear and unobstructed view up the track for a
considerable distance. The map shows that the distance
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from approximately the third of the four poles, counting
from west to east, to the east side of the bridge shown in
Exhibit 2 is about 370 feet. The court will observe also that
the view is clear and unobstructed well beyond the bridge.
For a clear appreciation of this fact we ask that defendant's
Exhibit 1 be again ·examined. This exhibit shows the straight
track running northwesterly far beyond the west end of the
bridge. Even plaintiffs' Exhibit B shows that the view from
the approximate point where the body was found-about
50 feet from the point of the accident-is clear and unobstructed to the east side of that bridge. The physical facts
cannot be ignored. These physical facts, as evidenced by
the above exhibits, show conclusively that if the deceased
had but looked when at any point from approximately the
poles to the moment of the accident she would have seen the
engine approaching. Her failure to do so was negligence,
and that negligence continued right up to the moment of
the accident.
Finally, counsel urge that a jury question was presented on the question of contributory negligence, citing and
relying upon the rule announced in Malizia v. Oregon Short
LineR. Co., 53 Utah 122, 178 P. 756. We can have no quarrel
with the rule announced in that case, but it is not applicable
at all to the facts of this case. In the Malizia case several
circumstances combined to possibly divert the attention of
the deceased. As the court observed in its opinion, there
were several trains operating back and forth in front of the
deceased, and his attention could have been diverted to one
passing in the opposite direction from the one which struck
him. It was the possibility that the deceased's .attention was
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diverted by other train movements and the possibility of
confusion created in his mind by the several 1novements
that raised such doubt as to his exercise of due care as to
create a jury issue on that question.

Newton v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 43 Utah 219, 134
P. 567, which is also relied upon by the plaintiffs, is similar
in its facts to the Malizia case. The·re the Utah court in announcing the rule stated :
"It is true that a party desiring to go on or pass
over a railroad track must not only look and listen
for approaching trains, but ordinarily he should so
look and listen as to make his vigilance effective.
But whether the traveler must make his vigilance
effective as against a multiplicity of dangers, when
such threaten him at the time and place, is, in cases
like the one at bar, the very question that must be
determined.''
The same argument was made in Jensen v. Oregon
Short Line Ry. Co., supra, and was disposed of in the following language :
"The controlling fact in practically all of the
cases relied on by respondent on this particular question is that the person attempting to cross or use
the street" was at the time of the accident apparently
or actually confronted with a 'multiplicity of dangers' which tended to confuse, mislead or disconcert
the mind to such an extent as to leave the matter of
contributory negligence in doubt."
In the present case there was nothing that confused
Mrs. Compton. There are no facts shown to create a doubt
as to the unreasonableness of her conduct, so there was
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nothing upon which the jury could act so as to excuse her
lack of care.
The court in the Malizia case cites and distinguishes
Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 Utah 275, 90 P.
402; Wilkinson v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 35 Utah 110, 99
P. 466; Bates v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 38 Utah
568, 114 P. 527; and Kent v. Ogden, L. & I. Ry. Co., 50 Utah
388, 167 P. 666. These are all cases in which, as in our
present case, there was nothing to divert the attention of
the deceased. In each of these cases it was held that conduct
similar to that of Mrs. Compton constituted negligence as
a matter of law. The rule of the Malizia and Newton cases
is expressed in the Wilkinson case as .follows:

"* * * In case the traveler has been misled
by some affirmative act of some employee of the
railroad company, such as a signaf to proceed from
a flagman stationed at the crossing, or where he
has been placed in sudden peril by some act of
omission or commission by the company, or where
he is in a situation where danger is threatened from
different directions and causes, and he has become
confused thereby and in like instances, he may be
excused, although he may have gone into a place of
danger and suffered injury through doing so. To
afford an excuse, the threatened danger from some
other source must, however, be imminent. * * *"
None of the explanations made by counsel can justify
deceased's failure to exercise due care. The facts show
that Mrs. Compton was negligent in stepping and walking
in front of the approaching engine. In the ·face of these
facts the presumption with which we commenced our con-
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sideration of this issue no longer exists. It fades out of the
picture and leaves only evidence from which, viewed in any
reasonable light, can be drawn but one conclusion-that the
deceased was negligent and her negligence contributed to
the fatal accident. It follows that the trial court did not
commit reversible error in so ruling.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY ON THE
THEORY OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE.
A. Deceased's Negligence Was Contributing and
Concurring Until the Moment of Impact.
It is not surprising that the humanitarian doctrine of
defendant's last clear chance is enshrouded with confusion.
The doctrine has been abused by attorneys who seek to invoke it in almost every instance where the evidence discloses contributory negligence. For a long time in the development of the doctrine courts encountered difficulty
determining just where the principle belonged in the body of
law, and not until it was treated, rightly or wrongly, as a
rule of causation did a semblance of order and consistency
in its application emerge. Even now considerable conflict
exists among the various jurisdictions with respect to it,
and care must be exercised in adopting the language of
opinions from various courts without first examining the
facts with respect to which the language was meant to
apply.
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The American Law Institute In its Restatement of
Torts has sought to resolve some of the conflicting treatment of this. doctrine. In Holmgren v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
. . . Utah ... , 198 P. 2d 459, the Utah Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Wolfe, stated that the Utah Court
has on more than one occasion cited with approval the rule
of last clear chance stated in the Restatement of Torts. It
seems to us then that an analysis of the problem of last
clear chance as applied to the instant case should commence
with a review of the rule announced in the Restatement.
Paragraphs 479 and 480 of Restatement of· Torts both
deal with the question of last clear chance. Paragraph 479
provides as follows :
"A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk of harm from the defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for harm caused thereby if, immediately preceding the harm,
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the

exercise of reasonable vigilance and care,
and
(b) the defendant
( i) knows of the plaintiff's situation
and realizes the helpless peril involved therein ; or
(ii) knows of the plaintiff's situation
and has reason to realize the peril
involved therein; or
(iii) would have discovered the plaintiff's situation and thus had reason
to realize the plaintiff's helpless
peril had he exercised the vigilance
which it was his duty to the plaintiff to exercise, and
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(c) Thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize
with reasonable care and competence his
then existing ability to avoid harming the
the plaintiff." (Italics added.)
This section, then, deals with the situation where the
plaintiff is physically unable to avoid the consequences of
his negligence and by reason thereof his fate rests entirely in
the hands of the defendant. In such a situation the rule
provides that the defendant is liable if in the exercise of
reasonable vigilance he should have discovered the plaintiff's helpless position in time to avoid injury to him.
Paragraph 480, which is entitled Last Clear Chance;·
Negligently Inattentive Plaintiff, and which is the section
to which Justice Wolfe was making specific reference in
the Holmgren case referred to above, proyides as follows:
"A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable
vigilance could have observed the danger created
by the defendant's negligence in time to have avoided
harm therefrom, may recover if, but only if, the
defendant
(a) knew of the plaintiff's situation, and

(b) realized or had reason to realize that the
plaintiff was inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid
the harm, and
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize
with reasonable care and competence his
then existing ability to avoid harming the ·
plaintiff." (Italics added.)
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Paragraph 480 then deals with the situation where the
plaintiff is physically able to avoid the consequence of his
negligence but because of negligent inattention fails to do so.
In such a situation the Restatement holds that the defendant
is liable only if it knew of the plaintiff's position and realized or should have realized that plaintiff was inattentive
and thereafter negligently fails to avoid injuring him.
If we analyze the cases in the light of the rules of the
~estatement, the first question would seem to be whether or
not the plaintiff was physically unable to avoid the injury
to himself or was merely negligently inattentive, and the
second question would be whether or not the defendant
actually saw the plaintiff in a position of peril in time to
avoid injury to him.
A review of the Utah cases discloses that the court

has consistently reasoned as the compilers of the Restatement reason, and has consistently reached the same results
as those recommended in the Restatement.
One of the earlier Utah cases dealing with the doctrine
of last clear chance, and a case which has been extensively
cited and quoted both in Utah and in other jurisdictions
and is somewhat of a landmark on the subject, is Teakle
v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 Utah 276, 90 P. 402.
This case is cited and quoted by plaintiffs as authority for
their argument that last clear chance applies in our present
case. A review of this case is invaluable to our present
analysis because in it we have an illustration of the fact
situation contemplated both by Rule 479 and Rule 480 of
the Restatement of Torts. In this case the deceased was
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walking along a track in the north yard of the defendant
railroad company at Salt Lake City. A switch engine was
backing along the track in the same direction the deceased
was walking. The crew failed to see the deceased and
struck him or his clothing just enough to knock him to the
ground. He was not run over by the train, was not killed,
but was rendered helpless. After the deceased was knocked
to the ground members of the crew observed him in his
perilous position. They tried to signal the engineer, but the
inattentive engineer failed to observe the signals and was
therefore unaware of the deceased's peril. The engine continued to back slowly until the pilot of the cowcatcher on
the engine, which extended out beyond the rest of the
engine, struck, crushed and killed the deceased who was
lying alongside the track. Because the switching movement
was slow, there was ample time to stop the engine between
the time the deceased was struck and the time he was
crushed by the pilot had the engineer been attentive. We
thus have a fact situation in which a negligently inattentive
man was struck and knocked down by a negligently inattentive train cre'\v. Up to the time he was struck the deceased
was able to avoid the consequences of his negligence by the
exercise of reasonable vigilance. This then is a situation
contemplated by paragraph 480 of the Restatement of Torts.
We would expect the court to hold that the defendant was
not liable unless it knew of deceased's perilous situation.
That is the ruling of the court. We quote from the decision
at page 408 in the Pacific Reporter:

"* * * His act of walking or stepping on the
track in front of the moving train without observation, as shown by the evidence, rendered him guilty
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of negligence as. rna tter of law. We think this is true
whether he was walking between the two tracks
east of the main track, or between the main track
and the track immediately east of it. In either event,
the evidence shows that he stepped upon the switch
track in front of the moving train, when but to look,
or otherwise to lise ordinary care on his part, would
have disclosed to him the approach of the train.
(Cases cited.) Such negligence on the part of the
deceased was a concurring and contributing cause
of the collision, and barred all right of recovery for
whatever injury resulted therefrom, upon the principle of law that when the negligence of two persons
is contemporaneous, and the fault of each operates
directly to cause the injury, neither can recover from
the other except for a willful or wanton infliction of
the injury. If, therefore, the deceased's death was
caused by the train's striking him, his contributory
negilgence barred recovery, for there is nothing to
show that the train's striking the deceased was done
willfully or wantonly. * * *"
The court then goes on to discuss the fact situation
presented after the deceased was struck and knocked down.
In such a situation the man was helpless. Although he had
been negligent, still, because of being knocked to the ground,
he was physically unable to avoid the consequences of that
negligence by the exercise of reasonable vigilance. This
then is a situation contemplated in paragrapp. 479 of the
Restatement of Torts. We might expect the court to rule
that if the defendant should in the exercise of reasonable
vigilance have discovered the helpless position of the plaintiff in time to avoid injuring him, then the defendant was
liable. This is the conclusion reached by the court. It discusses the question of whether the Utah Court is committed
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to the so-called doctrine of conscious last clear chance, or
discovered peril, rejects that proposition, and holds that
under such a fact situation the plaintiff can recover. Certainly this case illustrates that the rules of the Restatement
of Torts constitute the law in the State of Utah.

Ryan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 71, is
a case similar to the case under consideration on its facts
except only that there was more reason for application of
the doctrine of last clear chance in. the Ryan case than in
the instant case for the reason that the operators of the
defendant's train had a clear opportunity to avoid the collision had they observed the deceased. In this case the deceased was struck by a locomotive as he walked ·down the
defendant's tracks traveling in the same direction as the
locomotive. The death occurred in an area where the tracks
of the defendant were in regular use by pedestrians and
others. In one view of the evidence the deceased walked
40 or 50 feet down the track before being struck and killed;
in another view of the evidence he walked as far as 400
feet do,vn the track in front of the locomotive. The train
crew failed to see hhn until after he was struck. If we
analyze the facts of this case in the light of the rules of
the Restatement of Torts, vve find that it is a situation
conter:.1plated by paragraph 480-that is, a negligently inattentive plaintiff, or one who by the exercise of reasonable
vigilance could have observed his position of danger in
time to have avoided harm therefrom. Applying the rule of
paragraph 480, the evidence failed to show that the operators
of defendant's train knew of the plaintiff~s situation. We
might anticipate a conclusion that this was not a case in
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which the doctrine of last clear chance should be applied.
We quote from the court's decision on page 75 of the Pacific
Reporter:
"The court, however, submitted the case also on
the theory that, though the train crew had not discovered the deceased, yet, if they, in the exercise of
ordinary care, could have discovered him in time to
have avoided the collision and, omitting to exercise
that care, failed to discover him, then the defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause. In this the court
also erred, not because the doctrine is applicable only
to cases after discovery, for we are committed to the
rule that the doctrine, in a proper case, is also applicable where the perilous situation of the party injured could or ought to have been discovered, but,
because the assumed negligence of both parties was,
in such respect, active, concurring, combining, and
contributing at the very time of the impact, and the
one as direct and proximate as the other; that is,
if the defendant be found guilty of negligence in
not giving signals of the trairt's approach, or in not
observing a proper lookout to discover the presence
of those reasonably expected to be on or near the
track and in danger of being struck· by moving cars,
and if the deceased, as he was walking along the
track, also be found guilty of negligence in failing to
look for and to discover the train's approach, then
the negligence of both was active and concurring up
to the very time of the impact, and the collision the
result of the combined and concurring negligence of
both, and the one as direct and proximate as the
other. In such case the most that could be said is as
to which negligence, when the one is compared with
the other, was the greater or more culpable. But the
doctrine of comparative negligence does not prevail
in this jurisdiction, and is not to be confused, as it
sometimes is, with the doctrine of the last clear

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
chance. The rule here is that contributory negligence,
if it is a direct and contributing cause, bars recovery. ''lhen the court charged, as it did, that if the
defendant was guilty of negligence, and though the
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, and
that 'the negligence of each directly contributed to
the injury,' yet, if the defendant, in the exercise of
ordinary care, could have discovered the deceased in
a position of peril in time to have avoided the injury,
then the defendant's negligence was the proximate
and the deceased's the remote cau&e, it in effect
destroyed the defense of contributqry negligence
and gave a charge inconsistent with another that,
though the defendant was negligent yet, if the deceased 'was also negligent in any respeat,s in the performance of his own duty, and that neglect contributed in any degree to his accident and death, the
plaintiff in this case cannot complain that the defendant was also negligent, but your verdict in such
event must be for the defendant.' "

Knutson v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 78 Utah 145, 2
P. 2d 102, is a case in which the court deals with last clear
chance. In this case _the decedent, a small boy, apparently
either went to sleep on the tracks of the defendant railroad
or was a victim of sunstroke. The engineer of the defendant's train failed to see, or at least to distinguish the boy
as a human being, upon the tracks and in his position of
peril until it was too late for him to stop the train, although
there was evidence that he should have been able to recognize
the object as a child had he been reasonably vigilant. The
question was whether the contributory negligence of the
child, a licensee, in lying upon the tracks of the· defendant
barred recovery in this action by its parents, or whether the
defendant railroad company was liable under the doctrine
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of last clear chance. The trial court instructed the jury
as follows:
"If· you find that Chester Knutson went upon
the track of the defendant railroad company as a
licensee and there fell asleep, then, even though you
may find that such conduct was negligent, you are
instructed that the negligence of the said Chester
Knutson ceased at the moment he lost consciousness
in sleep and you are instructed that so long as he
remained asleep and oblivious to the danger attendant upon his position and unable to escape, the act
of sleeping upon said track was not such negligence
-as will bar the plaintiff's action for damages if you
should find that the defendant could, in the exercise
of reasonable care, have discovered the perilous
position of the said Chester Knutson in time to warn
him and avoid striking him."
The Supreme Court approved of this instruction in the
following language :
"If the Knutson boy was asleep or for other
reason was unconscious at the time in question, the
so-called doctrine of last clear chance was ·clearly
applicable. * * ·*"
It will be observed that in this case both the trial court
and the Supreme Court would apply the doctrine of last
clear chance only if it were determined a.s a question of fact
that the deceased child was asleep or otherwise unconscious
and thus that its negligence had come to rest. Before the
court would impose liability under the doctrine of last clear
chance, then, in a situation where the defendant failed to
observe the deceased in a position of peril, it required that
the facts presented came within the rule of paragraph 479
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of the Restatement of Torts-that is, where the deceased
because of unconsciousness was unable to avoid the consequences of his own negligence.
The latest Utah case dealing with last clear chance we
find is Andersen v. B~~ngham & Garfield Ry. Co., . . . Utah
... , 214 P. 2d 607. Although this case does not involve the
precise question we are now concerned with, paragraph 480
of the Restatement of Torts is again quoted and approved.
In its Instruction No. 12 on last clear chance the trial court
in this Andersen case instructed the jury in part as follows:
"Even though an injured party, through his
own negligence, placed himself in a position of peril,
he may, nevertheless, recover if the one who injures
him discovers, or by the exercise of ordinary. care,
should have discovered him and have avoided the
injury."
If our view of last clear chance is correct, it will be
seen that the above statement of the law is too broad in
that it extends the rule of Teakle v. San Pedro L.A. & S. L.
R. Co. to the situation of a negligently inattentive plaintiff.
It goes much further than the rule of paragraph 480 Restatement of Torts. It was unnecessary for the court in its
opinion to consider this error in the above instruction. The
falacy in the instruction apparenty did not go unnoticed,
however, for the court makes this statement with respect
thereto:

"* * * Nor do we express any opinion as to
whether Instruction No. 12 was erroneous ·in other
particulars."
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We find other cases in the Utah reports dealing with
the subject of last clear chance. We have analyzed only
three as clearly illustrating the position which the Utah
court has taken with respect to this controversial doctrine.
Among the more recent cases, Holmgren v. Union Pac. R.
Co., supra, supports this position. In that portion of the
opinion quoted hereinafter under point B, it will be observed the court stresses the requirement that the defendant's chance to avoid the accident be the last chance. We
find no cases in the Utah reports that deviate in any particular from the sound rules announced in the above cases
and supported by the American Law Institute in its Restatement of Torts. According to American Jurisprudence,
the Utah rules are in accord with those announced by a
majority of the courts in this country. Paragraph 223, 38
American Juris prudence, Negligence, deals with a situation
where the injured person is physically unable to escape, and
paragraph 224 deals with a situation where the injured
person is physically able to es.cape. We quote paragraph 223
in part as follows.:
"Considering the origin of the last clear chance
doctrine and its nature as a rule of proximate cause,
it should be applied to permit a recovery by a plaintiff whose original negligence had culminated in a
position of peril from which he was unable to extricate himself even by the performance of due care
on his part, against a defendant who, by the exercise
of reasonable care, could have avoided injuring the
plaintiff if he had discovered the danger to the
plaintiff as he reasonably ought to have done, notwithstanding he did not discover it. * * *"
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We quote paragraph 224 as follows:
"The great weight of judicial authority denies
the application of the last clear chance doctrine in
the situation where the defendant, while under a
duty to discover the danger to the injured person, did
not actually discover it and the injured person was
physically able to escape from the peril at any time
up to the moment of impact. Such view is certainly
consistent with the proximate cause view of the doctrine. * * *"
Also in 44 American Jurisprudence, Railroads, paragraph 489 it is stated:
"The great weight of judicial authority denie·s
the application of the last clear chance doctrine in
the situation where the defendant, while under a
duty to discover the danger to the injured person, did
not actually discover it and the injured person was
physically able to escape from the peril at any time
up to the moment of impact. Accordingly, the doctrine does not apply to the situation where the railroad company, while under a duty to discover a
person in a position of danger upon its, tracks or
adjacent thereto, did not actually discover his peril
and the imperiled person was physically able to
escape from the peril in time to avoid injury."
Because of the great divergence of views as to the
proper application of the doctrine of last clear chance, and
because the position which the Utah court has taken on the
subject is clear and unequivocal and the law in this jurisdiction may be said to be settled, little can be accomplished by
reference to opinions from other jurisdictions. Many of those
opinions are as a matter of fact misleading. Thus, in Cali-
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fornia there are cases in which the court interprets "physically unable to escape" as applying to a situation where the
plaintiff is negligently oblivious of his danger. It would
seem that the California court extends the, application of the
doctrine further than it would be extended in Utah or under
the rules of the Restatement of Torts. The truth is, however,
as examination of the California cases will show, the California court makes a much narrower application than does
the Utah court, since it limits the doctrine to what has been
termed the conscious last clear chance.
The case that we find most frequently quoted among
California decisions is Girdnerv. Union Oil Co. of California,
13 P. 2d 915, in which the court announces the rule as follows:
"Whether or not, therefore, negligence is the
proximate or remote cause is, as above stated, a
question of fact in each particular case. The doctrine of continuing negligence has no applica~ion
unless the negligence is the proximate cause of the
injury. On the other hand, if all the elements of
the last clear chance doctrine are present and plaintiff's negligence becomes remote in causation, then
this doctrine applies. If any one of the elements of
the last clear chance doctrine is absent, then plaintiff's negligence remains the proximate cause and
bars recovery. But the continuous negligence rule
does not apply to a situation in which the last clear
chance rule, by the presence of its own elements, is
brought into operation. Where these necessary elements are lacking, courts have declared, and rightfully so, that plaintiff's negligence being continuous
and contributory with that of defendant bars a
recovery. The necessary elements, as deduced from
the well-considered cases, may be stated in substance
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as follows: That plaintiff has been negligent and, as
a result thereof, is in a position of danger from
which he cannot escape by the exercise of ordinary
care; and this includes not only where it is physically impossible for him to escape, but also in cases
'vhere he is totally unaware of his danger and for
that reason unable to escape; that defendant has
kno~vledge that the plaintiff is in such a situation,
and knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should
know, that plaintiff cannot escape from such situation, and has the last clear chance to a void the
accident by exercising ordinary care, and fails to
exercise the same, and the accident results thereby,
and plaintiff is injured as the proximate result of
such failure. It has been said that such failure by
defendant to use ordinary care under such circumstances amounts to a degree of reckless conduct that
may well be termed willful and wanton, and when
an act is thus committed, contributory negligence
upon the part of the person injured is not an element
which will defeat a recovery." (Italics added.)
It will be observed therefore that the California court
limits the doctrine of last clear chance to those cases in
which the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff is in a
perilous situation. It refuses to recognize the rule of paragraph 479 of the Restatement of Torts, which rule has been
recognized by the Utah court from the beginning, or at least
since Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co.
Plaintiff cites Huggans v. Southern Pac. Co., (Cal.)
207 P. 2d 864, as a case in point, but the facts as stated by
the court show that the engineer of the train saw the
plaintiff before the collision.
The Supreme Court of Washington adheres to the Utah
rule and the rule of the Restatement of Torts. In Thompson
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v. Porter, 151 P. 2d 433, the Washington court quotes and
reaffirms the earlier decision in Mosso v. E. H. Stanton Co.,
75 Wash. 220, 134 P. 941, as follows:
" 'The courts are wide of an agreement as to the
extent of the last clear chance doctrine as applied
to the operation of trains, street cars, automobiles,
and the like. But what we conceive to be the sounder
view is this: Assuming that a traveler has negligently placed himself in a dangerous situation upon
the highway, then, as we have seen, whenever the
person in control of such agency actually sees the
traveler's situation and should appreciate his danger,
the last chance rule applies without regard to the
continuing negligence of the traveler concurring with
that of the operator up to the very instant of the
injury. A second situation to which the rule applies
is this: Where the person in control of such agency
by keeping a reasonably careful lookout, commensurate with the dangerous character of the agency
and the nature of the locality, could have discovered
and appreciated the traveler's perilous situation in
time, by the exercise of reasonable care, to avoid
injuring him, and injury results. from the failure to
keep such lookout and to exercise such care, then the
last chance rule applies, regardless of the traveler's
prior negligence, whenever that negligence has terminated or culminated in a situation of peril, from
which the exercise of ordinary care on his part would
not thereafter extricate him. This last phase of the
rule applies whenever injury results from new negligence or from a continuance of the operator's negligence after that of the traveler has so ceased or
culminated.
"The application of the rule to the first situation as above indicated needs no support outside of
simple considerations of humanity. Any other view
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would condone willful or wanton injury. The application of the rule to the second situation indicated
has been sustained by this court, and we· think
soundly, in a case of injury to an automobile stalled
through its owner's negligence on a railway crossing.

* * *
··An examination of a vast number of authorities
induces our conviction that the application of the
rule as above outlined is much broader than that
countenanced by many courts and is as broad as can
be applied without in effect overruling all of our
own decisions sustaining the defense of contributory
negligence and adopting in its stead the doctrine of
comparative negligence, a doctrine against which
this court has set its face from the beginning.

* * *' "
We believe this is a good statement of the law.
There is a clear application of the rule by the Washington court in Hopp v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. et al., 147 P. 2d
950. In this case the deceased was struck by defendant's
train at a railroad crossing. The court denied the· plaintiff's attempt to invoke the doctrine of last clear chance in
the following words :
"The respondent failed to produce any evidence
that indicated the existence of either of the two
situations where the last clear chance doctrine applies: namely, (1) where the operator of the instrumentality which inflicted the injury actually saw
the perilous situation of the other party and by the
exercise of reasonable care, could have avoided the
injury, and (2) where the operator of the instrumentality which inflicted the injury should have
seen and recognized the peril of the other party
whose own negligence had ceased leaving him in a
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position of danger from which he could not extricate
himself. See Leftridge v.. City of Seattle, 130 Wash.
541, 228 P. 302, which is a land mark case that has
been followed consistently by this court.
"The engineer did not see the car of the deceased prior to the collision ; hence, the first aspect
of the last clear chance doctrine cannot be applied;
and, since there is no evidence whatever that the
deceased was in an inextricable position, the second
aspect of the last clear chance doctrine cannot be
applied."
Plaintiffs at page 20 of their brief quote comment b
of The Restatement of Torts, Section 480. This comment, as
will be seen from a cursory reading, deals with the question
as to whether or not the defendant should realize plaintiff
is negligently inattentive, after he has been observed by the
defendant.
At page 23 of his brief the plaintiff quotes Graham v.
Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 Pac. (2d) 230, but a reading-of
the entire opinion clearly shows that the court is speaking
of a situation where, as in that case, the defendant saw
the plaintiff and realized or should have realized he was in
peril. Plaintiff has not produced a single case from Utah
or elsewhere that extends the doctrine as far as he requests
the court to extend it in this case.
There are three requirements to the rule of Section
480 of the Restatement of Torts. All three of them must
exist before the rule is applicable. It is the second requirement-that the defendant realized or had reason to realize
the plaintiff was inattentive-that has caused most of the
difficulty in applying the rule. It is the second requirement
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with which most of the cases are concerned. In reading the
decisions with respect to this portion of Section 480, we are
prone to forget or ignore the first requirement viz, that the
defendant knew of the plaintiff's situation. In no case that
we have found, however, has the Utah court forgotten or
ignored the first requirement. In all cases we have found
the Utah court has denied the application of the rule when
the first requirement of paragraph 480 was not met.
It is undisputed in this case that the train crew did not
see Mrs. Compton. There is no question but what the case
does not come within the rule of Section 480 because the
engine crew did not know of Mrs. Compton's situation. The
requirement o~ subparagraph (a) is missing. There is no
question but what it does not come within the rule of Section 479 because the deceased was negligently inattentive.
Again the requirement of subparagraph (a) of Section 479
is not met. This case falls within the rule of Ryan v. Union
Pac. R. Co., supra, and the first rule of Teakle v. San Pedro,
L. A. & S. L. R. Co., supra. It is not a last clear chance case.
It is a case of the deceased's negligence concurring and contributing up to the moment of impact, and the trial court
committed no error in so ruling.

B. The Defendant Did Not Have the Last Clear
Chance to A void the Accident.
If we assume, contrary to the clear expression of the
Utah court in all cases in which it has treated the subject,
that we are wrong in the preceding argument, still no error
was committed by the trial court in denying application of
the last clear chance doctrine. The evidence adduced at the
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trial does not show the engine crew had a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision. The deceased walked only
25 feet from the time she left the stairway to the point of
impact. Even at its closest point the track was 171;2 feet
from the bottom of the stairway. The physical facts and the
testimony of Officer Feller may be used to explain Mrs.
Laws' testimony that she and the deceased took "a few
steps" down the track before the impact, and that evidence
shows she could not have walked down the track more than
two or three steps and could not have been in a position of
peril along the track more than a second or two before
being struck. Plaintiffs argue that the deceased was in a
position of peril from the moment she left the stairs and
proceeded toward the track, and a Missouri case is cited as
authority. Perhaps Missouri with its extremely broad concept of last clear chance will support them in that position,
but the Utah cases do not. In Holmgren v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., . . . Utah ... , 198 P. 2d 459, the court quotes
with approval the opinion from Johnson v. Sacramento
Northern Ry., 54 Cal. App. 2d 528, 129 P. 2d 503, as follows:
" 'It is also significant to note that the "situation of danger" or "position of danger," referred to
in the authorities dealing with the last clear chance
doctrine, is reached only when a plaintiff, moving
toward the path of an oncoming train or vehicle, has
reached a position "from which he cannot escape by
the exercise of ordinary care." In other words, it
~is not enough, under the last clear chance 1.doctrine,
that plaintiff is merely approaching a position of
danger, for until he has reached a position of danger,
he has the same opportunity to avoid the accident by
:the exercise of ordinary care, as has the: defendant.
In such cases the ordinary rules of negligence and
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contributory negligence apply, rather than the exceptional doctrine of last clear chance. It is only in
cases in which, after plaintiff reaches a position of
danger, defendant has a last clear chance to avoid
the accident by the exercise of ordinary care, and
plaintiff has no similar chance, that the doctrine is
applicable.' (Italics added.)"
"And also:
'It must be remembered that the last clear
chance doctrine involves just what its name implies.
As this court said in Poncino v. Reid-Murdock & Co.,
136 Cal. App. 223, at page 227, 28 P. 2d 932, at page
934, "In other words, it is not enough to relieve a
plaintiff of his own negligence that the defendant
may have had a chance to avoid the accident, but defendant must have had the last chance and also had
a clear chance to do so by the exercise of ordinary
care. That he should have had the last chance implies that his chance to avoid the accident must have
come later in point of time than any similar chance
on the part of the injured person. That he should
have had a clear chance implies that he must have
had more than a bare possible chance to avoid an
unexpected peril created practically simultaneously
with the happening of the accident by the negligence
of the injured party".' "
In Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 112
Utah 189, 186 P. 2d 293, the court stated:
"The opportunity to avoid the accident must not
be a possibility, it must be a clear opportunity."
And

'' * * * if the doctrine of last clear chance
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mitted the train crew to appreciate the deceased's
predicament and to give warning sufficiently early
enough for the deceased to extricate himself, or the
time element was sufficient to permit the crew to
bring the train to a stop."
In Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 P. 2d 230,
the court stated:
"One should not be held liable for failing to
avoid the effect of the other's negligence in a situation where it is speculative as to whether he was
afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. In a situation where both parties are on the move the significance of the word 'clear' is most important. Otherwise we may put the onus of avoiding the effect of
one's negligence on a party not negligent. That
party's negligence only arises when it is definitely
established that there was ample time and opportunity to avoid the accident which was not taken advantage of."
On the rehearing of the Graham case the court reemphasized and strengthened the requirement that the
defendant's last chance be a clear opportunity. We quote
from the opinion on rehearing, 109 Utah 365, 172 P. 2d 665:
"When on'e party thrusts upon another the onus
of avoiding an accident which was due entirely to the
fact that the first party is in the fairly rapid process of placing himself in the path of a car driven
by the second party, the court, before it permits the
jury to determine whether the second party could
have avoided the accident, must be reasonably sure
that there was time enough for the jury to so find.
Where the situation is, to reasonable minds, so
doubtful as to whether the second party had time to
avoid it, the matter should not be given to the jury;
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otherwise, '\Ve are, as said in the case of Thomas v.
Sadleir, Utah, 162 P. 2d 112, 115, in grave danger
of permitting the one really at 'fault to shift the
blame for the accident on the other by accentuation
· of the other's duty to avoid the effect of the first
one's negligence.'

*

*

*

*

*

"Her opportunity to avoid the accident must not
be a mere possibility but a clear opportunity."
See also J.llarshall v. Ogden Ry. & Depot Co., ... Utah
... , 221 P. 2d 868.
It is difficult to apply the rules of these recent cases to
the facts of our present case wherein the evidence shows
that the def~ndant never did see the negligent plaintiff
until after the fatal collision. But, nonetheless, these cases
make clear the position of the Utah court on the ·subject
of last clear chance. If a plaintiff would have the court
invoke the doctrine in his favor, he must show by some
evidence that the defendant had a clear opportunity and not
just a mere possibility to avoid the collision.
In any view of the evidence, taking all reasonable in~
ferences therefrom most favorable to the plaintiffs, the
deceased could not have been in a position of peril for more
than a second or two. If this is a last clear chance case. at
all, the defendant's obligation under that doctrine arose only
at the time she entered that position of peril. Commencing
at that moment, the evidence must show defendant had a
clear opportunity ·for observation, accurate reflection and
effective reaction with the means at hand. Reason argues
strongly against even a bare possibility that the tragedy
could have been so prevented, and it closes the door against
the suggestion that there was then a clear opportunity to
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avoid it. It follows that the action of the trial court in refusing to submit the case to the jury under the issue of last
clear chance should be sustained.
The evidence disclosing as a matter of law that the deceased was contributorily negligent, that negligence bars
any recovery by these plaintiffs. Van Wagoner v. Union
Pac. Ry. Co., 112 Utah 189, 186 P. 2d 293.
CONCLUSION
As stated earlier in our brief, we believe the answers
to all the various questions involved in this appeal are to be
found in the Utah Reports. We have avoided reference to
other authorities except in one or two instances to show
that the Utah rule is in line with the majority or with what
text authorities view as the better reasoning. In any event,
the law as announced by the Utah court is that which
governed the conduct of Mrs. Compton and the defendant's
engine crew at the time of this accident. That law was the
light in which the judge·was required to view the evidence
at the trial. In so doing the trial court committed no reversible error and the judgment entered should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
D. A. ALSUP,
Counse.l for Defendant
and Respondent.
10 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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